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Perhaps the greatest socio-ethical challenges associated with the develop-ment and use of transgenic animals in biomedical research are the prob-
lems associated with animal welfare. Whereas the issue of biosafety does, in-
deed, represent a major concern, the minimization of such risk is as much a 
prudential concern as an ethical one for investigators, as they themselves are 
put at risk by failure to provide adequate safeguards against the dangers of 
transgenic animal research. Animal welfare concerns, on the other hand, rep-
resent a far greater moral challenge, for concern about animal welfare often 
does not coincide with perceived self-interest and, indeed, can exact costs in 
terms of self-interest, in the form of money, time, extra personnel, delay 
in research, etc. In other words, many researchers have traditionally not 
equated concern for animal welfare with self-interest and are, thus, unlikely 
to do the right thing for reasons of self-interest. Somewhat mitigating this 
blanket statement is the relatively recent acknowledgement of the fact that 
failure to assure animal welfare can skew variables relevant to research and 
actually compromise research (Rollin, 1990), but nonetheless, the coinci-
dence of the two is far from perfect. As we shall see, certain aspects of trans-
genic animal research do represent an area where welfare could be ignored 
without obviously jeopardizing the work in question. Thus moral concern 
must take up the slack left after prudential considerations are exhausted.
The emergence of a systematic social ethic whose purview extends to the 
treatment of laboratory animals is a relatively recent phenomenon, as evi-
denced by the fact that researchers basically enjoyed carte blanche in the use 
of animals until the mid 1980s (Rollin, 1991). For most of the 19th and 20th 
centuries, the only consensus ethical principle extant in society for the treat-
ment of animals was a prohibition against overt, willful, intentional, need-
less, wanton cruelty, as expressed in anti-cruelty legislation. Concerned as 
much with ferreting out sadistic individuals who might begin with animals 
and move to humans as with protecting animals, these laws, therefore, did 
not address “normal,” “necessary” or “beneficial” sources of animal suffering
such as agriculture, research, hunting, trapping or education; these are typi-
cally exempted from the anti-cruelty laws by statute, or else have been ex-
cluded by judicial decision. Rather, the laws focused on deviant behavior 
leading to “unnecessary” animal suffering. It is only in the past decade that 
society has begun to realize that a mere fraction of animal suffering is a result 
of overt cruelty—the vast majority of animal suffering at human hands, in 
fact, grows out of such decent motivations as increasing knowledge, curing 
disease, increasing efficiency of food production, protecting humans against 
toxic substances and so on. Correlative with this realization has come a de-
mand for the control of suffering in areas of animal use which previously en-
joyed laissez faire, notably toxicity testing, animal research and animal agri-
culture. First to be directly affected by this demand was animal research, with 
two major pieces of federal legislation designed to assure the welfare of re-
search animals passed in the U.S. in 1985.
Perhaps the main feature of this legislation, which I have discussed at 
length elsewhere (Rollin, 1989; 1991), is a mandate to control pain, suffering 
and distress in research animals except where scientifically necessary, as in 
the study of pain, and even there, to minimize it as far as possible. Second, 
the legislation is designed to assure “enforced self-regulation” of animal re-
search and dialogue about animal welfare concerns, through the vehicle of 
protocol and facilities review by animal care committees. Third, the legisla-
tion suggests that welfare concerns are not limited to controlling overt pain 
and suffering, but actually points towards providing some positive opportu-
nity for animals to express their biological and behavioral natures—this is 
exemplified by the requirements of exercise for dogs and provision of an en-
vironment conducive to the psychological well-being of primates. This legis-
lation has already had many salubrious effects on the welfare of laboratory 
animals, perhaps the most dramatic being the focusing of scientific attention 
on recognizing, characterizing and alleviating animal pain. It has also led re-
searchers to far greater awareness of ethical questions in research, something 
which was traditionally stifled by widespread belief that science is and ought 
to be, “value-free” (Rollin, 1989).
Thus, we see the emergence of a new ethic for animals demanding, in es-
sence, maximization of the interests of animals while they are being used for 
human benefit. The most articulate expression of this ethic thus far, has been 
the demand for the control of animal pain and suffering in research.
For certain aspects of transgenic animal use, this demand will be rela-
tively easy to satisfy. Consider, for example, the patented Harvard mouse 
which is disposed to the development of tumors. In the words of the patent, 
this is “an animal whose germ cells and somatic cells contain an activated 
oncogene sequence introduced into the animal...which increases the prob-
ability of the development of neoplasms (particularly malignant tumors) in 
the animal” (U.S. Patent Number 4,873,191). Minimizing pain and suffering
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for such an animal is, in principle and in fact, no different from minimizing 
pain and suffering in nontransgenic animals in whom tumors are induced by 
other means: the establishment of endpoints for euthanasia, in terms of tu-
mor size, so that the animal does not suffer, and the judicious use of anesthet-
ics, analgesics and tranquilizers during operative or other procedures.
Similarly, there is no reason the second major thrust of the new social 
ethic cannot be applied to these transgenic animals—namely the provision of 
enriched environments and husbandry systems for these animals which allow 
them to actualize their behavioral and biological natures. In the case of trans-
genic mice, for instance, one should look to the recommendations outlined 
in literature on care of mice; for example, a recent article described a caging 
system for rodents that is meant to accommodate their behavioral needs 
(Sharmann, 1991). Indeed, the characterization of such environments and 
systems for a variety of animals is a primary purpose of the chapters in a 
book I am currently editing (Rollin and Kesel, in press). Thus, the vast ma-
jority of transgenic animals developed so far raise no additional welfare is-
sues beyond those concerning nontransgenic laboratory animals.
Indeed, those welfare issues which are raised dramatically by transgenic 
animals are also continuous with analogous nontransgenic cases. I am refer-
ring to the creation and maintenance of seriously defective animals which are 
developed and propagated to model some human disease. This was tradition-
ally accomplished through identification of adventitious mutations and se-
lective breeding. Transgenic technology allows for accomplishing the same 
goal far more quickly and in a far wider range of areas. One can essentially 
replicate, in principle, any human genetic disease in animals—and therein 
lies the major ethical concern growing out of transgenic technology.
A recent chapter in a book devoted to transgenic animals helps to focus 
the concern:
There are over 3,000 known genetic diseases. The medical costs 
as well as the social and emotional costs of genetic disease 
are enormous. Monogenic diseases account for 10% of all ad-
missions to pediatric hospitals in North America... and 8.5% 
of all pediatric deaths.. .. They affect 1% of all liveborn in-
fants. .. and they cause 7% of stillbirths and neonatal deaths.
... Those survivors with genetic diseases frequently have sig-
nificant physical, developmental, or social impairment. . . .
At present, medical intervention provides complete relief in 
only about 12% of Mendelian single-gene diseases; in nearly 
half of all cases, attempts at therapy provide no help at all 
(Karson, 1991.)
This is the context in which one needs to think about the animal welfare is-
sues growing out of the use of transgenic animals in biomedical research.
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On one hand, it is dear that researchers will embrace the creation of animal 
models of human genetic disease as soon as it is technically feasible to do so. 
Such models, which introduce the defective human genetic machinery into 
the animal genome, appear to researchers to provide convenient, inexpensive 
and—most importantly—high fidelity models for the study of the gruesome 
panoply of human genetic diseases outlined in the over three thousand pages 
of text comprising the sixth edition of the standard work on genetic disease, 
The Metabolic Basis of Inherited Disease (Scriver et al., 1989). Such “high fi-
delity models” may well reduce the numbers of animals used in research, a 
major consideration for animal welfare, but are more likely to increase the 
numbers as more researchers engage in hitherto impossible animal research. 
On the other hand, the creation of such animals can generate inestimable 
amounts of pain and suffering for these animals since genetic diseases, as 
mentioned above, often involve symptoms of great severity. The obvious 
question then becomes the following: Given that such animals will surely be 
developed wherever possible for the full range of human genetic disease, how 
can one assure that vast numbers of these animals do not live lives of constant 
pain and distress? Such a concern is directly in keeping with the emerging 
social ethic for the treatment of animals; as we said, one can plausibly argue 
that minimizing pain and distress is the core of recent federal legislation con-
cerning animal use in research.
The very first attempt to produce an animal “model” for human genetic 
disease by transgenic means, as mentioned earlier, was the development, by 
embryonic stem cell technology, of a mouse which was designed to replicate 
Lesch-Nyhan’s disease, or hypoxanthine-guanine-phosphororibosyl trans-
ferase (HRPT) deficiency (Hooper et al., 1987; Keuhn et al., 1987). Lesch- 
Nyhan’s disease is a particularly horrible genetic disease, leading to a “devas-
tating and untreatable neurologic and behavioral disorder” (Kelley and 
Wyngaarden, 1983). Patients rarely live beyond their third decade and suffer 
from spasticity, mental retardation and choreoathetosis. The most unforget-
table and striking aspect of the disease, however, is an irresistible compulsion 
to self-mutilate, usually manifesting itself as biting fingers and lips. The fol-
lowing clinical description conveys the terrible nature of the disease:
The most striking neurologic feature of the Lesch-Nyhan syn - 
drome is compulsive self-destructive behavior—between 2 and 
16 years of age, affected children begin to bite their fingers, 
lips and buccal mucosa. This compulsion for self-mutilation 
becomes so extreme that it may be necessary to keep the el-
bows in extension with splints, or to wrap the hands with gauze 
or restrain them in some other manner. In several patients, mu-
tilation of lips could only be controlled by extraction of teeth.
The compulsive urge to inflict painful wounds appears 
to grip the patient irresistibly. Often he [sic] will be content
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until one begins to remove an arm splint. At this point a com-
municative patient will plead that the restraints be left alone.
If one continues in freeing the arm, the patient will become 
extremely agitated and upset. When completely unrestrained, 
he will begin to put the fingers into his mouth. An older pa-
tient will plead for help and if one then takes hold of the arm 
that has previously been freed, the patient will show obvious 
relief. If help is not forthcoming, a painful and often severe 
injury may be inflicted. The apparent urge to bite fingers is 
often not symmetrical. In many patients it is possible to leave 
one arm unrestrained without concern, even though freeing the 
other would result in an immediate attempt at self-mutilation.
These patients also attempt to injure themselves in other 
ways, by hitting their heads against inanimate objects or by 
placing their extremities in dangerous places, such as in be-
tween the spokes of a wheelchair. If the hands are unrestrained, 
their mutilation becomes the patient’s main concern and effort 
to inflict injury in some other manner seems to be sublimated 
(Kelley and Wyngaarden, 1983).
At the present, “there is no effective therapy for the neurologic complications 
of the Lesch-Nyhan’s syndrome”(Stout and Caskey, 1988). Thus Kelley and 
Wyngaarden, in their chapter on HRPT-deficiency diseases, boldly suggest 
that “the preferred form of therapy for complete HRPT-deficiency (Lesch- 
Nyhan’s syndrome) at the present time is prevention,” i.e. “therapeutic abor-
tion” (Kelley and Wyngaarden, 1983). This disease is so dramatic that I pre-
dicted almost a decade ago that it would probably be the first disease for which 
genetic researchers would attempt to create a model by genetic engineering.
Researchers have sought animal models for this syndrome for decades 
and have created rats and monkeys that will self-mutilate by administration 
of caffeine and other drugs (Boyd et al., 1965). Thus, it is not surprising that 
the first disease genetically engineered by embryonic stem cell technology 
was, indeed, Lesch-Nyhan’s disease (Hooper et al., 1987; Keuhn et al., 1987). 
However, these animals were phenotypically normal and displayed none of 
the metabolic or neurologic symptoms characteristic of the disease in hu-
mans. The reasons for this are unknown (Stout and Caskey, 1988).
This case provides us with an interesting context for our animal welfare 
discussion. Although the animals were, in fact, asymptomatic, presumably at 
some point in the future researchers will be able to generate a symptomatic 
model transgenically. Let us at least assume that this can occur—if it cannot, 
there is no animal welfare issue to concern us! Whether one ought to create 
such animals is a question I have addressed elsewhere (Rollin, 1986). The prac-
tical moral question that arises is clear: Given that researchers will certainly 
generate such animals as quickly as they are able to do so, how can one assure
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that the animals live lives that are not characterized by the same pain and dis-
tress which they are created to model?
Again, this question does not differ in kind from the moral questions as-
sociated with developing traditional chronic animal models of human dis-
ease, be it by breeding, pharmacological manipulation or tissue destruction. 
The difference is in degree—transgenics provides the potential for generat-
ing vast numbers of animals modeling genetic diseases with devastating 
symptoms. A second difference lies in the fact that transgenic technology is 
developing at precisely the same time that social/ethical demand for control-
ling pain and suffering in research animals is at its historical peak and seems 
to be increasing.
Regrettably, researchers in the past have been cavalier in controlling 
pain and suffering in animals used as chronic disease models. Though many 
of the animals have required extraordinary amounts of care and husbandry, 
such efforts have been directed, for the most part, at keeping the animals 
alive and scientifically functional rather than at controlling pain and suffer-
ing. Given our current social ethic, it is increasingly imperative that pain and 
suffering be controlled in all animals used for research. Thus, concern for 
this dimension of animal care needs to be a fundamental principle which 
guides those contemplating the transgenic creation of animals which repli-
cate human genetic disease. Such an issue is a true moral challenge for re-
searchers, as concern for the animals’ quality of life will undoubtedly make 
things more difficult and expensive for researchers. At the same time, it is 
patent that such concern is both morally and socially obligatory. Further-
more, failure to assure the public that animal suffering is being minimized 
could well accelerate major political constraints on all areas of biotechnology 
(Rollin, 1986).
Unfortunately, because the research community traditionally ignored 
this moral component of animal research, there is no vast literature on con-
trolling pain and suffering in chronically defective animals. There has prob-
ably been more scientific attention to such questions during the six years fol-
lowing the passage of the aforementioned federal legislation than in the en-
tire previous history of animal research (Rollin, 1989). Doubtless such atten-
tion will continue to grow at a significant rate. Researchers undertaking work 
with animals which model human genetic disease should, therefore, vector 
these concerns into protocol planning and budgeting; funding agencies 
should demand such planning, and animal care and use committees should 
not approve projects until they have evidenced that pain, suffering and dis-
tress are controlled.
In many cases—perhaps in a symptomatic Lesch-Nyhan’s animal—man-
agement of suffering may require a far more radical approach than the stan-
dard uses of anesthesia, analgesia and tranquilization, which are, by and
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large, used for short periods of time. If a defective animal is to be kept alive 
for long periods and is likely to experience pain and suffering during that pe-
riod, researchers should consider the possibility of effecting total elimination 
of consciousness. One such approach could involve surgically rendering an 
animal decerebrate, so that, while vegetative functions are extant, the animal’s 
subjective experience has been shut down. Alternatively, and perhaps more 
viably, one could render an animal irreversibly comatose so that it was effec-
tively anesthetized throughout its life. Unfortunately, virtually no literature 
exists on induction of coma.
I have galvanized a team of researchers at Colorado State University to 
explore this drastic possibility. We utilize animals scheduled to be euthanized 
for other reasons and attempt to induce irreversible coma in these animals by 
induction of cerebral hypoxia. We hope to find a clear EEG criterion which 
signals coma. If the method is successful, perhaps the method could be taught 
to veterinarians at institutions planning to utilize animal models of genetic 
disease so that the animals will not needlessly suffer.
Obviously, such methods of controlling pain and suffering are very dras-
tic and their effective application is fraught with difficulties. For example, 
they could, presumably, only be employed where higher brain function is es-
sentially irrelevant to the study of the disease. Whether this is the case or not 
with Lesch-Nyhan’s disease, for example, once it was established that the trans-
genic animal, indeed, showed all signs of the disease, is unclear. I believe it is. 
Certainly, at least some metabolic genetic diseases could be studied in this way.
Equally significant, there is something aesthetically, at least and perhaps 
morally as well (I am not clear on this), about deliberately creating such ani-
mals. At the very least, it dramatically perpetuates the notion that society is 
seeking to transcend—that animals are simply tools for human expedient 
use. It is, in my view, the lesser of two evils.
The key point is that this dimension of genetic engineering of animals 
cannot be ignored. There is, as we saw, every reason to believe that transgenic 
animals will be created to study human genetic disease as soon as the techno-
logical capability exists to do so. Extant laws permit such animals to be cre-
ated. The mindset of the research community makes it inevitable. It is also 
clear that such diseases can cause enormous amounts of pain and suffering.
In the face of this development, responsible researchers need to explore all 
possible avenues for controlling such pain and suffering. These approaches 
should include such established methods as the liberal use of anesthetics, an-
algesics and tranquilizers, and by making as much of the research as possible 
acute. But these methods are unlikely to be effective in the case of those dis-
eases where suffering begins at birth or is chronic after a certain stage of de-
velopment. (Lesch-Nyhan’s patients, as we mentioned, do not show symp-
toms from birth, but do exhibit them chronically after their onset.) Thus,
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methodologies need to be developed which will control pain and suffering 
over extended periods of time. There is, thus far, no reason to believe that the 
research community has yet engaged this issue vis d vis animals used in other 
chronically painful work, let alone in genetically engineered animals. The 
development of such methodologies for controlling pain and suffering is 
likely to be exportable to numerous areas of animal research, not only trans-
genic creation of disease. Only in this way can research attempt to stay in har-
mony with the ethical stance of the society which allows and supports it.
REFERENCES
Boyd, E.M., M. Dolman, L.M. Knight and E.P. Sheppard. 1965. The Chronic 
Oral Toxicity of Caffeine. Can. J. Physiol, and Pharm. 43:95.
Hooper, M., K. Hardy, A. Handyside, S. Hunter and M. Monk. 1987. HPRT- 
Deficient (Lesch-Nyhan) Mouse Embryos Derived from Germline Colo-
nization by Cultured Cells. Nature. 326:292.
Karson, E.M. 1991. Principles of Gene Transfer and the Treatment of Disease. 
In Transgenic Animals. N. First and F.P. Haseltine, eds. Butterworth- 
Heinemann, Boston.
Kelley, W.N. and J.B. Wyngaarden. 1983. Clinical Syndromes Associated with 
Hypoxanthine-Guanine Phosphororibosyltransferase Deficiency. In The 
Metabolic Basis of Inherited Disease, fifth edition. J.B. Stanbury, J.B. 
Wyngaarden, D.S. Fredrickson, J.L. Goldstein, and M.S. Brown, eds. 
McGraw-Hill, New York.
Kuehn, M.R., A. Bradley, E.J. Robertson and M.J. Evans. 1987. A Potential 
Model for Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome Through Introduction of HPRT Mu-
tations into Mice. Nature. 326:295.
Rollin, B.E. 1986. The Frankenstein Thing. In Genetic Engineering of Animals.
J.W. Evans and A. Hollaender, eds. Plenium Press, New York.
Rollin, B.E. 1989. The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and 
Science. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Rollin, B.E. 1990. Ethics and Research Animals-Theory and Practice. In The 
Experimental Animal in Biomedical Research, Volume I. B.E. Rollin and 
M.L. Kesel, eds. CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL.
Rollin, B.E. 1991. Federal Laws and Policies Governing Animal Research: 
Their History, Nature and Adequacy. In Biomedical Ethics Reviews 1990. 
J.M. Humber and R.F. Almeder, eds. Human Press, Clifton, N.J.
Rollin, B.E. and M.L. Kesel, eds. in press. The Experimental Animal in Bio-
medical Research, Volume II. CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL.
Scriver, C.R., A. L. Beaudet, W. S. Sly and D. Vale, eds. 1989. The Metabolic 
Basis of Inherited Disease, Volumes I and II. McGraw Hill, New York. 
Sharmann, W. 1991. Improved Housing of Mice, Rats and Guinea Pigs: A 
Contribution to the Refinement of Animal Experiments. Atla. 19:108.
Animal Biotechnology; Opportunities & Challenges
Stout, J.T. and C.T Caskey. 1988. Hypoxanthine Phosphororibosyltransferase 
Deficiency: The Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome and Gouty Arthritis. In The 
Metabolic Basis of Inherited Disease, Volume one. C.R. Scriver, A.L. 
Beaudet, W.S. Sly and D. Vale, eds. McGraw-Hill, New York.
United States Patent number 4,873,191, October 10, 1989.
93
Animal Well-Being
